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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
AND EXPERT TESTIMONY:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE NEW YORK
STATE COURT OF APPEALS
Andrew C. Fine
INTRODUCTION
Crawford v. Washington1 promised an entirely new approach
to the Confrontation Clause.2 Under the regime of Ohio v.
Roberts,3 the scope of the Clause was essentially coterminous
with the rule against hearsay. A nontestifying declarant’s out-ofcourt statements, including her written reports, were generally
admissible in New York because of the state’s expansive view of
the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Crawford, however,
overruled Roberts and seemed to signal transformative change,
because it explicitly severed the link between the Clause and the
scope of the prohibition against hearsay. The decisive inquiry
became whether an out-of-court hearsay statement is testimonial
in character, rather than whether it is reliable. If a statement is
testimonial, and is offered for its truth, its introduction is
prohibited in the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant, regardless of its evidentiary admissibility.
In deciding to abandon the Roberts approach, Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Crawford condemned the Roberts Court’s willingness
to “leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of
Director, New York Court of Appeals Litigation, The Legal Aid Society,
Criminal Appeals Bureau.
1
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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the rules of evidence,”4 and to “allow[] a jury to hear evidence,
untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial
determination of reliability.”5 “Dispensing with confrontation
because testimony is obviously reliable,” the opinion declares,
“is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is
obviously guilty.”6 Accordingly, a hearsay statement’s
reliability, as measured by whether a judge concludes that it fits
under a hearsay exception or believes that it is otherwise
“trustworthy,” has become irrelevant under the Confrontation
Clause. If the declarant does not testify and the statement is
testimonial within the meaning of the Clause, its admission
violates the Clause, regardless of its reliability. Out-of-court
statements from a nontestifying declarant that are not offered for
their truth, however, do not run afoul of the Clause.7
In Crawford’s aftermath, important questions have arisen
regarding its applicability to an expert’s “basis” testimony that
either incorporates or relies upon out-of-court statements by
nontestifying declarants. In addition, courts have addressed the
constitutional admissibility of lab reports based on tests
conducted by nontestifying analysts, and whether the
Confrontation Clause problem can be finessed by offering the
reports through the testimony of experts who were not involved
in the testing process. This piece will address the manner in
which the New York State court of appeals has grappled with
Crawford and its progeny in the area of expert testimony and lab
reports.
Since Crawford, New York’s high court has, unlike most
appellate courts, recognized the hearsay character of an expert’s
“basis” testimony that incorporates the statements of
nontestifying declarants. If those statements are testimonial in
character, their introduction through the expert violates the
Confrontation Clause. However, the court of appeals has simply
refused to recognize that the Supreme Court’s post-Crawford

4
5
6
7

541 U.S. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 59.
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decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,8 subsequently
reinforced by Bullcoming v. New Mexico,9 squarely held that the
introduction of laboratory reports prepared by nontestifying
declarants, and any expert testimony based on them, is
prohibited by the Clause. Supreme Court precedent contradicts
the court of appeals’ rulings upholding the admission of such
evidence.
I. EXPERT “BASIS” TESTIMONY RELYING ON STATEMENTS MADE
10
BY NONTESTIFYING DECLARANTS: PEOPLE V. GOLDSTEIN
Prior to Crawford, most courts viewed an expert witness’
“basis” testimony as nonhearsay. In such jurisdictions, the
documents, lab reports, or other information upon which the
expert relied were ostensibly not being offered for their truth,
but rather only to assist the jury in evaluating the validity of the
expert’s opinion.11 The federal courts that have followed this
approach have relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which
allows an expert to base an opinion on “facts or data in the case
that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed,”
and further declares that such facts “need not be admissible for
the opinion to be admitted.” Moreover, even if such facts
“would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion
may disclose them to the jury,” if their probative value
“substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”
Since the federal approach is premised on the view that
“basis” testimony is not hearsay, such testimony seemed to be
immune from Crawford scrutiny when offered in cases tried in
federal courts, and in states with similar evidentiary rules.
Indeed, that is how most federal courts have treated this subject
12
since Crawford, and a number of state courts have relied on
8

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
10
People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2005).
11
E.g., United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993);
Boone v. Moore, 980 F.2d 539, 542 (8th Cir. 1992); People v. Nieves, 739
N.E.2d 1277, 1284 (Ill. 2000).
12
See, e.g., United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1128–29 (11th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Pablo, 625 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 2010).
9

460

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

similar provisions in their evidence codes to reach the same
result.
However, New York has no evidence code or written rules,
and the New York court of appeals—unlike most jurisdictions—
has long considered an expert witness’ “basis” testimony to be a
form of hearsay that could run afoul of the Confrontation
Clause. In People v. Sugden, the court recognized that the
Clause is potentially implicated when a prosecution expert
“base[s] his opinion on material not in evidence,”13 and in
People v. Stone,14 the court acknowledged the “legally hearsay”
character of expert testimony reliant upon out-of-court
statements.15 But, anticipating the rationale that the Supreme
Court would thereafter adopt in Ohio v. Roberts, the court, in
essence, created a reliability-based hearsay exception. The court
stated that a prosecution expert “may rely on material, albeit of
out-of-court origin, if it is of a kind accepted in the profession
as reliable in forming a professional opinion.”16 Post-Crawford,
the Sugden/Stone approach retains validity as an evidentiary
matter, but the hearsay exception set forth in those decisions can
no longer justify the introduction of such expert testimony by the
prosecution without calling the declarant, if the statements on
which it is based are testimonial in character.
The New York court of appeals recognized this in People v.
Goldstein. In that case, which involved an insanity defense, a
private psychiatrist hired by the prosecution relied on her out-ofcourt interviews with nontestifying witnesses regarding the
defendant’s alleged prior conduct to support her opinion that
Goldstein was not insane, and recited the contents of those
interviews before the jury.
The court of appeals rejected defendant’s evidentiary
challenge to the professional reliability of the interviews under
But cf. United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197–99 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding
it improper to permit expert police officer to communicate out-of-court
testimonial statements of nontestifying confidential informants and
cooperating witnesses directly to the jury as the basis for his expert opinion).
13
People v. Sugden, 323 N.E.2d 169, 172 (N.Y. 1974).
14
People v. Stone, 315 N.E.2d 787, 791 (N.Y. 1974).
15
Id.
16
Sugden, 323 N.E.2d at 173.
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Sugden and Stone.17 However, it ruled that the contents of the
interviews constituted testimonial hearsay and hence were
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by
Crawford. The prosecution argued that their psychiatrist’s
recitation of the contents of her interviews with nontestifying
declarants was not hearsay because it was admitted merely to
assist the jury in evaluating the psychiatrist’s opinion. In
dismissing this claim, the court declared, “[w]e do not see how
the jury could use the statements of the [nontestifying]
interviewees to evaluate [the prosecution psychiatrist’s] opinion
without accepting as a premise either that the statements were
true or that they were false. Since the prosecution’s goal was to
buttress [the psychiatrist’s] opinion, the prosecution obviously
wanted and expected the jury to take the statements as true.”18
Accordingly, the statements “were offered for their truth, and
are hearsay.”19
The Goldstein court then ruled that the hearsay statements
relied on by the psychiatrist were testimonial as well, and
therefore that their introduction in the declarants’ absence violated
the Confrontation Clause under Crawford. It reasoned that the
interviewees had to have known that the prosecution had retained
17

Even though it approved the admission of the expert’s reliance on the
civilians’ statements as an evidentiary matter, the Goldstein Court was
troubled by the notion that an expert may “repeat to the jury all the hearsay
information on which [her opinion] was based.” People v. Goldstein, 843
N.E.2d 727, 731 (N.Y. 2005). It recognized that “it can be argued that there
should be at least some limit on the right of the proponent of an expert’s
opinion to put before the factfinder all the information, not otherwise
admissible, on which the opinion is based. Otherwise, a party might
effectively nullify the hearsay rule by making that party’s expert a ‘conduit
for hearsay.’” Id. (quoting Hutchinson v. Groskin, 927 F.2d 722, 725 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
18
Id. at 732.
19
Id. at 733; accord People v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 711–14
(Ct. App. 2009), review granted, 220 P.3d 240 (Cal. Dec. 2, 2009); see
People v. Archuleta, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 727, 731 (Ct. App. 2011); People v.
Hill, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251, 270–79 (Ct. App. 2011). The Supreme Court
may well resolve the expert basis hearsay issue for Sixth Amendment
purposes in Williams v. Illinois, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted,
131 S. Ct. 3090 (argued Dec. 6, 2011) (No. 10-8505).
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the psychiatrist to testify against Goldstein. Accordingly, “all of
them should reasonably have expected their statements ‘to be used
prosecutorially’ or ‘to be available for use at a later trial.’”20
The admissibility of the expert’s opinion itself was not at
issue in Goldstein, but since the opinion was based in part on
the inadmissible statements made to the psychiatrist, it was
dependent on testimonial hearsay and hence suffered from the
same constitutional defect. The expert’s opinion could not be
fairly evaluated in the absence of an opportunity for crossexamination of the declarants who provided the necessary
foundation.21 Nor would the problem be solved by not revealing
on the stand the testimonial hearsay on which the expert relied.
Camouflaging the sources of the opinion puts the cross-examiner
“in an untenable position: expose the inadmissible hearsay or
forego effective cross-examination.”22
In view of the court of appeals’ prior treatment of expert
“basis” testimony as hearsay, the outcome in Goldstein was not
surprising, though it represents a minority view nationally. But
it is difficult to deny its underlying logic: if acceptance of an
expert’s opinion is dependent on another person’s statement, the
opinion is worthless unless the statement is true.23
20

Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d at 733 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)). The court further held that the statements were
sufficiently “formal” to qualify as testimonial, noting that Crawford itself did
not require strict formality, and found a statement to be testimonial that “was
unsworn and used colloquial phrasing.” Id. It also determined that although
the psychiatrist was not a “government officer . . . . the Confrontation
Clause would offer too little protection if it could be avoided by assigning the
job of interviewing witnesses to an independent contractor rather than an
employee.” Id. at 733–34.
21
See Richard D. Friedman, Initial Thoughts on Williams,
CONFRONTATION BLOG (July 9, 2011), http://confrontationright.blogspot.
com/2011/07/initial-thoughts-on-williams.html; see also Julie A. Seaman,
Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries of Expert
Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 879 (2008).
22
Paul Shechtman, People v. Goldstein and Rule 703, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
13, 2006, at 4, col. 4; accord Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791,
856–57 (2007); Seaman, supra note 21, at 879.
23
See Mnookin, supra note 22.
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II. NEW YORK’S INITIAL POST-CRAWFORD TREATMENT OF
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS ADMITTED IN THE ANALYST’S ABSENCE:
PEOPLE V. RAWLINS, PEOPLE V. MEEKINS, AND PEOPLE V.
FREYCINET
The next cases before the court of appeals regarding the
applicability of Crawford to expert testimony about scientific
procedures were People v. Rawlins and People v. Meekins
(decided jointly).24 In Rawlins, a police detective, who did not
testify, examined latent fingerprints that had been lifted from
two burglary sites. The detective’s report, introduced at trial in
the detective’s absence over the defendant’s Confrontation
Clause objection, concluded that those prints matched the
defendant’s right thumbprint. By a vote of six to one, the court
held in Rawlins that the fingerprint comparison report
constituted testimonial hearsay under Crawford, and thus its
admission at trial in the absence of the specialist’s testimony
violated Rawlins’ Confrontation Clause rights.25 In Meekins,
however, the court unanimously upheld the introduction of a
DNA testing report through the testimony of experts who did
not participate in the testing, even though the experts who
conducted the tests were not called to the stand. The report,
based on tests conducted by a private laboratory at the behest of
police, did not include a comparison of that DNA with the
defendant’s.26 The majority opinion discussed the circumstances
under which business records prepared by or at the behest of
law enforcement should be deemed to constitute testimonial
hearsay under Crawford.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the most critical issue is
whether a law enforcement “business record” directly accuses
24

People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 1033. A second detective who also offered this report testified to
his independent assessment of the sets of prints, concluding that they matched
the defendant’s prints. A third detective testified to the match as well, as a
defense witness. Relying on their testimony, the court of appeals held that the
erroneous introduction of the report by the nontestifying detective, in
violation of the Confrontation Clause, constituted harmless error. Id. at
1022–24, 1033–34.
26
Id. at 1034–36.
25
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the defendant of a crime. Thus, the court stated, “[O]ur task in
each case must be to evaluate whether a statement is properly
viewed as a surrogate for accusatory in-court testimony.”27 Such
reports, the court suggested, will likely be viewed as
testimonial, but even more clearly, the court indicated that few
others would be. Adopting a pinched view of Crawford, the
court rejected as “too broad” a test that depends on the
declarant’s reasonable expectation that a statement will be used
prosecutorially.28 It determined that the result in Davis v.
Washington,29 allowing the introduction of a nontestifying
domestic-violence complainant’s accusations against her former
boyfriend in a 911 call, would have been different had this
standard been determinative, since the complainant could well
have expected her statements to be used against Davis at trial.30
The court also considered the proper practice for lab reports
that memorialize results of scientific tests, relying heavily on the
“insights” and “reasoning” underlying three pro-prosecution
state high court decisions, State v. Crager,31 People v. Geier,32
and Commonwealth v. Verde,33 which it found to be
“instructive.”34 The court adopted the Massachusetts supreme
judicial court’s reasoning in Verde that the drug-test certificates
at issue did not “concern the exercise of fallible human
judgment,” but “merely [recorded, contemporaneously, the
procedures taken and] state[d] the results of a well-recognized
scientific test determining the composition and quantity of the
substance.”35 Such “contemporaneous recordation of scientific
27

Id. at 1029.
Id.
29
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
30
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1029.
31
State v. Crager, 116 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2007-Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d
745, cert. granted, vacated mem., 129 S. Ct. 2856 (June 29, 2009) (No. 0710191).
32
People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007).
33
Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005), abrogated
by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
34
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1030–32.
35
Id. at 1031 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 705).
28
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protocol,” the court reasoned, “must be undertaken independent
of any possible use at trial, for the independent purpose of
ensuring that the test was properly administered.”36
Discussing the Ohio supreme court’s decision in Crager,
which involved a DNA report, the court of appeals noted that
the technicians “could have reasonably expected that
the . . . reports would be used in a later prosecution,” but that
the Ohio court determined that any concern that the reports
could be “prejudicial is allayed . . . because such notes
‘represented the contemporaneous recordation’ of the . . . results
‘as [they were] actually performing those tasks’ pursuant to
industry protocols.”37 Accordingly, “police or prosecutorial
involvement in a case like Crager becomes a nonissue, and the
focus shifts to declarant.”38 Adapting the “primary purpose” test
used by Davis v. Washington39 to evaluate whether statements
made in response to police interrogation are testimonial, the
court of appeals concluded that a technician’s motivation and
purpose are to “simply record[], contemporaneously, the
administration of scientific protocol to reveal what is hidden
from the naked eye”; the technician “ordinarily has no
subjective interest in the test’s outcome.”40 The court also cited,
with approval, the Ohio court’s reasoning that the lab, although
its mission was to “aid law enforcement,” was “not itself an
‘arm’ of law enforcement in the sense that . . . [its] purpose
[was] to obtain incriminating results.”41
Judge Jones’ opinion for the court approvingly noted that in
Geier, another DNA case, the California supreme court had
similarly relied upon the “contemporaneous recordation”
rationale; the DNA analysis, the court of appeals reasoned, was
based on observations similar to those of a Davis-style declarant

36

Id.
Id. at 1030–31 (quoting State v. Crager, 116 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2007Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745, cert. granted, vacated mem., 129 S. Ct. 2856
(June 29, 2009) (No. 07-10191)).
38
Id. at 1031.
39
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
40
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1031.
41
Id. at 1030 (quoting Crager, 879 N.E.2d at 753).
37
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who is reporting an emergency.42 “[T]he . . . raw data were not
‘accusatory’ ( . . . in a Sixth Amendment sense) and the analyst
did not ‘bear witness’ against defendant.”43 Rather, she
generated the report “for the purpose of adhering to
‘standardized scientific protocol.’”44
Though the courts emphasized the “objectivity of the scientific
procedures at issue” in these three cases, none of the reports that
were held admissible were “directly accusatory, in the sense that
they explicitly linked the defendants to the crimes.”45 The court of
appeals viewed this to be critical. It was “particularly noticeable
in Geier” that although the laboratory analysis was conducted by
nontestifying technicians, “the comparison to defendant’s DNA
was made by a testifying witness.”46 Though this distinction “is
not an infallible touchstone,” the court wrote, “[i]n close
cases, . . . the directness with which a particular statement points
to the defendant as the offender is a factor to be considered.”47
However, the court also said that “statements can often be
testimonial where their tendency to inculpate the defendant is only
indirect.”48
Summarizing its overall approach, the court stated that “[t]he
question of testimoniality requires consideration of multiple
factors, not all of equal import in every case.”49 Two of these,
however, “play an especially important role in this determination:
first, whether the statement was prepared in a manner resembling
ex parte examination and second, whether the statement accuses
the defendant of criminal wrongdoing.”50 These “interrelated
touchstones” are informed by “the purpose of making or
generating the statement, and the declarant’s motive for doing
51
so . . . .”
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1032.
(quoting People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140 (Cal. 2007)).
(quoting Geier, 161 P.3d at 140).
at 1033.
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Applying these principles to Rawlins, the court concluded
that the fingerprint reports at issue were testimonial because
their maker, “a police detective, prepared his reports solely for
prosecutorial purposes and, most importantly, because they were
accusatory and offered to establish defendant’s identity.”52
Comparing latent prints recovered from a crime scene with
fingerprints from a known individual “fit the classic definition of
‘a weaker substitute for live testimony’ at trial.”53 The technician
was “‘testifying’ through his reports that, in his opinion,
defendant is the same person who committed the burglaries,”
and his only purpose was “to ultimately apprehend a
perpetrator . . . .”54 Rebutting the argument that the report was
business related, rather than an effort “to nail down the truth
about past criminal events,” the court noted that “it was the
business of [the police technician] to establish (if possible) who
committed the crime.”55 Though his conclusions could have
exculpated Rawlins, the direct involvement of this law
enforcement officer “‘presents unique potential’ for abuse.”56
The court ruled in Meekins, however, that the DNA reports
at issue were nontestimonial.57 That the testers “did not
determine whether the data [they] collected matched [defendant]
or any other suspect” was critical to this outcome.58 The DNA
test results, “standing alone,” without any “‘comparisons of the
results’ to any known DNA profiles,” “shed no light on the guilt
of the accused in the absence of an expert’s opinion that the
results genetically match a known sample.”59 Only the Medical
Examiner’s office determined a match with defendant, and
defendant did not challenge the “Medical Examiner’s role.”60
The testing procedures were “neither discretionary nor based on
opinion,” and the testers “only contemporaneously recorded the
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006)).
at 1033 n.14.
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 n.6 (2004)).
at 1034.
at 1035.
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procedures employed and ‘state[d] the results of a wellrecognized scientific test.’”61 Thus, the report “is not the kind of
ex parte testimony the Confrontation Clause was designed to
protect against.”62 Though the technicians “knew or had every
reason to know . . . that their findings could generate results
that could later be used at trial,” law enforcement’s involvement
was nevertheless “inconsequential” because it could not have
influenced the outcome of the tests.63 Moreover, the prosecution
called a supervising witness from the lab who, though not
involved in the tests at issue, was available for crossexamination regarding whether the lab’s testing protocol was
followed.64
Finally, “the documents . . . were not directly accusatory;
none of them compared the DNA profile they generated to
defendant’s.”65 In this regard, the court noted that the document
prepared by the Division of Criminal Justice Services notifying
the Medical Examiner’s office that there was a DNA match was
not a business record, and, because it “comes close to a direct
accusation that defendant committed the crime, . . . is less
clearly nontestimonial hearsay than the other documents at
issue.”66 But “any error” in admitting that document was
harmless.67
In People v. Freycinet,68 the court addressed a defendant’s
Confrontation Clause challenge to the introduction of an autopsy
report, in the absence of testimony from the doctor who
performed the autopsy and prepared the report. The report was
“redacted to eliminate [the doctor’s] opinions as to the cause and
manner of the victim’s death.”69 Another doctor in the medical
examiner’s office, who did not participate in the autopsy,
61

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Verde, 827
N.E.2d 701, 705 (2005)).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1035–36.
67
Id. at 1036.
68
People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008).
69
Id. at 844.
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testified to her opinions based on the facts in the absent
pathologist’s report. The court applied the rationale of Meekins
to unanimously reject the defendant’s claim.
First, the court noted its prior holding in People v.
Washington.70 In Washington, the court held that autopsy
reports, prepared by physicians associated with the office of
New York City’s Medical Examiner, were not discoverable
under state law; that the Medical Examiner’s office is “not a law
enforcement agency”; and that the duties of the office are
“independent of and not subject to the control of the office of
the prosecutor.”71 The report was “very largely a
contemporaneous, objective account of observable facts.”72
Though the doctor’s finding characterizing the victim’s injury as
a “stab wound” was the product of an exercise of professional
judgment, its significance to the case “derives almost entirely
from [the absent doctor’s] precise recording of his observations
and measurements as they occurred.”73 Thus, it was “hard to
imagine” that the report, as redacted, “could have been
significantly affected by a pro-law-enforcement bias.”74 The
opinion ends by relying on the report not “directly link[ing] the
defendant to the crime,” since it was concerned with “what
70

People v. Washington, 654 N.E.2d 967 (N.Y. 1995).
Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846. The court of appeals’ focus in Freycinet
on whether the medical examiner’s office is an arm of the prosecution, and
its approving reference in Rawlins to the Crager court’s focus on the DNA
lab not being an “arm of law enforcement,” are difficult to reconcile with the
court’s treatment of a similar Crawford-related issue in Goldstein. In
Goldstein, the prosecution hired a private psychiatrist to rebut defendant’s
insanity defense. The Court held that the psychiatrist’s recitation of out-ofcourt statements by nontestifying declarants, which she relied on in support
of her opinion, violated Goldstein’s Confrontation Clause rights. People v.
Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2005). In rejecting the prosecution’s
reliance on the psychiatrist not being a “government officer,” the court
reasoned that “[t]he Confrontation Clause would offer too little protection if
it could be avoided by assigning the job of interviewing witnesses to an
independent contractor rather than an employee.” Id. at 733–34; see also
sources cited supra note 21.
72
Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846.
73
Id.
74
Id.
71
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happened to the victim, not with who killed her.”75 Thus, “[the
absent doctor] was not defendant’s ‘accuser’ in any but the most
attenuated sense.”76
III. THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS’ REFUSAL TO FOLLOW
MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS
The Supreme Court repudiated every essential aspect of the
New York court of appeals’ approach to this issue in MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts.77 Police searched a car in which Luis
Melendez-Diaz was riding. They found a plastic bag containing
nineteen smaller bags hidden in the partition between the front
and back seats, and ultimately charged Melendez-Diaz with
selling cocaine.78 The only proof that the bags recovered by
police contained cocaine consisted of three sworn “certificates of
analysis” showing the results of forensic testing performed on
the seized substances.79 Neither the analyst nor any other expert
was called to testify. Without detailing the nature of the testing,
the certificates merely reported the weight of the bags and
asserted that they contained cocaine.80 The certificates were
sworn to by analysts at the State Laboratory Institute of the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health,81 which is not a law
enforcement agency.82 This practice of admitting a sworn
“certificate of analysis” was authorized by statute, and the
certificate constituted “prima facie evidence of the composition,
quality, and the net weight” of the substance.83 Melendez-Diaz’s
Confrontation Clause objection was overruled.
On appeal, the Massachusetts appeals court rejected the
defendant’s Confrontation Clause claim, on the authority of the
Massachusetts
supreme
judicial
court’s
decision
in
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id.
Id.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
Id. at 2530.
Id. at 2531.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2531 (majority opinion).
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Commonwealth v. Verde, which had held such certificates to be
nontestimonial, and that the makers of such certificates are
accordingly not subject to confrontation.84 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding, by a vote of five to four, that the certificates
were testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation
Clause, since the defendant had been given no opportunity to
cross-examine the nontestifying analysts. Justice Scalia wrote the
Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Thomas. Justice Thomas joined in the opinion but also filed
a concurrence, adhering to his previously announced view that
“the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial
statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions.”85 He concluded that the sworn
certificates at issue in Melendez-Diaz were clearly affidavits, and
thus “‘fall within the core class of testimonial statements’
governed by the Confrontation Clause.”86
Justice Scalia’s opinion begins by quoting the three potential
formulations of “testimonial” statements set forth in Crawford.87
He noted that these categories “mention[] affidavits twice,”88 and
then continues,
The documents at issue here, while denominated by
84

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007
WL 2189152, at *4 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. July 31, 2007)).
85
Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
86
Id. (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
87
Id. at 2531 (majority opinion).
Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements
exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions; statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
88
Id. at 2532.
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Massachusetts law “certificates,” are quite plainly
affidavits: “declaration[s] of facts written down and
sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to
administer oaths.”89 They are incontrovertibly a “solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.”90
The majority concluded that the certificates were testimonial
because (1) they qualified as affidavits, (2) they contained “the
precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide if
called at trial,” and (3) they were “made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial” (quoting
91
from the broadest formulation of “testimonial” in Crawford).
Perhaps most significantly as one considers New York
practice, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the major
premise of Meekins/Freycinet: that whether a statement is
“accusatory” in that it directly implicates the defendant in
wrongdoing is vital to a resolution of its testimonial status.
Instead, relying on the language of the Clause, the Court
determined that the relevant issue is whether the statement
relates to facts necessary for a conviction.92
89

Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (8th ed. 2004)).
Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
91
Id. at 2531–32.
92
Respondent first argues that the analysts are not subject to
confrontation because they are not ‘accusatory’ witnesses, in that
they do not directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing; rather, their
testimony is inculpatory only when taken together with other
evidence linking petitioner to the contraband . . . This finds no
support in the text of the Sixth Amendment or in our case law.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right ‘to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.’ To the extent the
analysts were witnesses (a question resolved above), they certainly
provided testimony against petitioner, proving one fact necessary for
his conviction—that the substance he possessed was cocaine. The
contrast between the text of the Confrontation Clause and the text of
the adjacent Compulsory Process Clause confirms this analysis.
While the Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the right to
be confronted with the witnesses ‘against him,’ the Compulsory
Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to call witnesses ‘in
90
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Regarding “business records” and “public records,” the
Court made it clear that when such records are prepared for
litigation purposes, they did not qualify under the “business
records” exception as it had originally been recognized under
the common law.93 The opinion specifically notes that “the
results of a coroner’s inquest”—i.e., an autopsy report—were
not exempt from confrontation under early American common
law.94 Of course, this suggests strongly that autopsy reports are
testimonial and hence inadmissible without the testimony of the
examining pathologist95—a view that had been almost uniformly
rejected by lower courts after Crawford.
Relatedly, Melendez-Diaz roundly rejects the notion that
reporting the results of a forensic test is somehow less
testimonial because such testing is “neutral” and “scientific,” in
contrast with “testimony recounting historical events, which is
‘prone to distortion or manipulation . . . .’”96 The Court
explained that “[t]his argument is little more than an invitation
to return to our overruled decision in Roberts,”97 which focused
on a statement’s reliability rather than its testimonial character.
The Supreme Court majority peremptorily rejected the
dissent’s view that its opinion “sweeps away an accepted rule
governing the admission of scientific evidence” that “has been
established for at least 90 years,”98 pointing out that nearly all of
those decisions either relied on, or were decided under the same
his favor.’ U.S. CONST., amend. VI. The text of the Amendment
contemplates two classes of witnesses—those against the defendant
and those in his favor. The prosecution must produce the former; the
defendant may call the latter. Contrary to respondent’s assertion,
there is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution,
but somehow immune from confrontation.
Id. at 2533–34 (footnote omitted).
93
Id. at 2538–40.
94
Id. at 2538.
95
Accord Harry Sandick & Justin Mendelsohn, Divided Supreme Court
Extends Reach of Confrontation Clause, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 2009, at 4, col.
1.
96
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

474

standard as, Ohio v. Roberts, which was overruled by
Crawford.99
It also seems clear that under Melendez-Diaz, a forensic lab
report prepared for prosecution need not have been generated by
a law enforcement official or agency in order to qualify as
testimonial. Although the reports at issue were not prepared by a
law enforcement agency,100 the Court emphasized that the report
was prepared “under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would
be available for use at a later trial,”101 not the identity of the
analyst’s employer. The dissenters, in contrast, would not
require confrontation of declarants who could not qualify as
“adversarial government officials responsible for investigating
and prosecuting crime.”102
In addition, the Court, in dicta, took issue with the notion
that “‘neutral scientific testing’ is as neutral or as reliable” as
the prosecution suggested.103 The opinion cites studies critical of
police laboratory techniques, refers to “documented cases of
fraud and error involving the use of forensic evidence,” and
points out that “[c]onfrontation is designed to weed out not only
the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well.”104 It
notes reliability problems that have been uncovered regarding
“common forensic tests such as latent fingerprint analysis,
pattern/impression analysis, and toolmark and firearms

99

Id. at 2533 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2531; id. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy noted that “[t]here is no indication that the analysts here—who work
for the State Laboratory Institute, a division of the Massachusetts Department
of Public Health—were adversarial to petitioner. Nor is there any evidence
that adversarial officials played a role in formulating the analysts’
certificates.” Id.
101
Id. at 2532 (majority opinion) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)).
102
Id. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Carolyn Zabrycki,
Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody
the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1093, 1118
(2008)).
103
Id. at 2536 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
104
Id. at 2537.
100
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analysis.”105 And it further declares that there may be no viable
alternative to cross-examination as a means of challenging
autopsies and breathalyzer test results.106 This, of course,
strongly suggests that such reports are testimonial. In MelendezDiaz, moreover, the certificates merely contained the test result
(cocaine was found), but not what tests were performed or
“whether interpreting their results required the exercise of
judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not have
possessed.”107
Finally, the Court declined to “relax the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause to accommodate the ‘necessities of trial
and the adversary process’”:
It is not clear whence we would derive the authority to
do so. The Confrontation Clause may make the
prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is
equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—
like those other constitutional provisions—is binding, and
we may not disregard it at our convenience.108
The Court also disputed the premise that this requirement will
be onerous, concluding that most defendants who go to trial will
not insist on producing the analyst, particularly in drug cases,
and that “there is no evidence that the criminal justice system
has ground to a halt in the States that, one way or another,
empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst’s appearance at
trial.”109 Melendez-Diaz rejected virtually all of the arguments
that were relied upon by the court of appeals in Meekins and
Freycinet to justify its viewpoint that many types of forensic lab
reports and other scientific reports, including ones generated in
anticipation of prosecution, are nontestimonial. Indeed, the
105

Id. at 2538. Though these types of police and scientific reports were
discussed in dicta, they likely reflect the Court’s viewpoint that all of these
documents are testimonial, as long as they contain evidence relevant to
proving an element of a crime and are made in anticipation of prosecutorial
use.
106
Id. at 2536 & n.5.
107
Id. at 2537.
108
Id. at 2540.
109
Id. at 2540–42.
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Supreme Court has rejected, either directly or indirectly, all
three of the out-of-state decisions relied on so heavily by the
court of appeals. Commonwealth v. Verde provided the basis for
the Massachusetts intermediate appellate court’s now-reversed
disposition of the Melendez-Diaz case itself.110 In Barba v.
California,111 the Supreme Court vacated an unpublished
California intermediate appellate court decision directly applying
People v. Geier to an identical DNA fact pattern, and remanded
for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz.112 The Supreme
Court similarly vacated and remanded the Ohio supreme court’s
decision in State v. Crager.113
The centerpiece of the court of appeals’ analysis in Meekins
and Freycinet is its premise that perhaps the most critical
determinant of a statement’s “testimoniality” is whether it is
“accusatory,” in that it directly implicates the defendant in
wrongdoing. In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court held such
reasoning to be antithetical to the very language of the
Confrontation Clause, which guarantees an accused’s right to be
confronted with the witnesses “against” him.114 Any witness who
110

See Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL
2189152, at *4 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. July 31, 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2527
(2009).
111
Barba v. California, 129 S. Ct. 2857 (2009).
112
See People v. Barba, No. B185940, 2007 WL 4125230 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 21, 2007), cert. granted, vacated mem., 129 S. Ct. 2857 (2009).
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Geier itself. Geier v. California, 129
S. Ct. 2856 (June 29, 2009) (No. 07-7770). In Geier, however, the
California supreme court decided alternatively that even if the introduction of
the DNA report violated the Confrontation Clause, any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140–41 (Cal.
2007). That would have made any United States Supreme Court decision
irrelevant to the outcome of the case, and likely explains the certiorari denial.
113
Crager v. Ohio, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009).
114
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534; see also Paul Shechtman, Not
Many Fireworks During a Workmanlike Term, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 31, 2009, at
S12–S13 (“The analysis in Melendez-Diaz calls into question the thoughtful
opinions of the Court of Appeals in Freycinet and Rawlins . . . [which] relied
principally on the fact that the analysts whose forensic reports were received into
evidence were not ‘accusatory’ witnesses. But in Melendez-Diaz, Justice
Antonin Scalia rejected the notion that the Confrontation Clause distinguishes
between accusatory and nonaccusatory witnesses.”).
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provides facts helpful to the prosecution in proving an element
of the crime, the Court ruled, is a witness “against” him under
the Clause.115
Moreover, in flatly rejecting the viewpoint that an analyst is
somehow immunized from confrontation because she is making
“near-contemporaneous observations,”116 the Supreme Court
nullified another major underpinning of the analytical foundation
of Meekins and Freycinet. In both decisions, the court of appeals
relied on the virtually contemporaneous observations of the
technicians, both in its discussion of the out-of-state authority it
deemed persuasive,117 and in its analysis of the facts of the cases
before it.118
Nevertheless, in People v. Brown,119 the court of appeals,
after Melendez-Diaz, reaffirmed the holding and analysis in
Meekins, and held that a DNA report processed by a laboratory
working as a subcontractor to the medical examiner’s office was
not testimonial. Given the rationale of Melendez-Diaz, the
decision of the court of appeals to confirm the analysis of
Meekins in the Brown case is baffling, and analytically
insupportable. Indeed, the opinion simply ignores the most
pertinent aspects of the analysis in Melendez-Diaz, which are
incompatible with Meekins.
In Brown, as in Meekins, the prosecution was permitted to
introduce a DNA report containing the results of a genetic test
of a male specimen taken from the victim’s rape kit, performed
by a laboratory (Bode) that acted as a subcontractor for the New
York City Medical Examiner’s office. No analyst from Bode
115

See supra p. 472 and note 92.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535.
117
E.g., People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1030–31 (N.Y. 2008)
(stating that the DNA report in Crager “‘represented the contemporaneous
recordation’ of the . . . results ‘as [they were] actually performing those
tasks’ pursuant to industry protocols.” (alteration in original) (quoting State
v. Crager, 116 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2007-Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745, 756)).
118
E.g., Id. at 1035 (stating that the technicians “only contemporaneously
recorded the procedures employed”); see also People v. Freycinet, 892
N.E.2d 843, 846 (N.Y. 2008) (stating that the autopsy report was “very
largely a contemporaneous, objective account of observable facts”).
119
People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009).
116
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was called to testify. The only expert called was a forensic
biologist/criminalist from the Medical Examiner’s office, who
compared the genetic profile of male DNA found in the rape kit
analyzed by Bode with a specimen of the defendant’s DNA, and
determined there to be a match.
The court of appeals rejected the defendant’s Confrontation
Clause challenge to the introduction of the rape kit DNA testing
report. Melendez-Diaz notwithstanding, the court restated the
Meekins analytical framework as asserting the governing
standard, and applied it to hold that the report was not
testimonial and hence that its admission did not violate the
Clause. In so doing, it relied upon the nonaccusatory nature of
the report,120 its conclusion that the report was not testimonial
because it “consisted of merely machine-generated graphs,
charts and numerical data,”121 and its view that, since the tests
were conducted before the defendant was a suspect and neither
the laboratory nor the Medical Examiner’s office is a law
enforcement entity, “any pro-law-enforcement benefit to
manipulating the results” was thereby eliminated.122 Each of
these rationales is flatly rejected by Melendez-Diaz. The court of
appeals made a limited attempt to distinguish Melendez-Diaz by
pointing out that, unlike in that case, the prosecution in Brown
called an expert who made the determination that the defendant’s
DNA matched the male DNA recovered from the rape kit that
was analyzed by the lab; the court noted that she could have
been cross-examined regarding the results of her comparison and
about her knowledge of the lab’s procedures.123 As this Article
will discuss,124 the Supreme Court soon specifically repudiated
the latter distinction.
Thus, one wonders whether the results of any of the court of
appeals’ decisions on this subject can be reconciled with
Melendez-Diaz. Certainly, the result in Rawlins was not
120

Id. at 931–32.
Id. at 931.
122
Id. at 932.
123
Id. at 931.
124
See infra pp. 125–26 (discussing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.
Ct. 2705 (2011)).
121
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affected. The fingerprint comparison report was a formal police
report that was prepared for litigation. Indeed, in MelendezDiaz, the Supreme Court specifically called attention to the
value of confrontation regarding “latent fingerprint analysis.”125
But Meekins and Brown are analytically irreconcilable with
Melendez-Diaz.
Although the DNA test results in Meekins did not report a
match, the Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz that whether a
document is accusatory or nonaccusatory is utterly irrelevant to
its testimonial character. The Meekins court’s rejection of the
significance of the declarant’s reasonable expectation of
prosecutorial use is no longer valid; the Supreme Court relied
heavily on that standard in Melendez-Diaz. Similarly, the court
of appeals in Brown, as in Meekins, relied on the DNA report’s
near-contemporaneous nature, its scientific validity, and its
generation by a non-law-enforcement agency in holding the
report to be nontestimonial, but Melendez-Diaz rejected each of
these justifications for admission. Under the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Melendez-Diaz, such a document would be
testimonial since it was generated at the behest of law
enforcement, prepared in anticipation of a criminal prosecution,
and offered to assist in proving an essential element of the
charged crime. The post-Melendez-Diaz court of appeals’
decision in Brown simply ignores all of this.
Based on Melendez-Diaz alone, one would think that
Freycinet would have a short shelf life as well. As in Meekins,
the Freycinet court found it critical that the report in question
(here, an autopsy report) did not directly link the defendant to
the crime, and hence that the pathologist “was not defendant’s
126
‘accuser’ in any but the most attenuated sense.” As noted,
whether a document is “accusatory” in nature is no longer
relevant, as long as the document is offered to prove facts
helpful to the prosecution, which the report in Freycinet was.
Similarly, the court’s reliance on the report being “very largely
a contemporaneous, objective account of observable facts,”127
125
126
127

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2009).
People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846 (N.Y. 2008).
Id.
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and its having been prepared by a declarant who was employed
by a non-law-enforcement agency, is incompatible with
Melendez-Diaz. Moreover, as discussed above, the MelendezDiaz Court referred specifically to autopsy reports, in a manner
strongly suggesting that they are to be considered testimonial.
Under the now-applicable Supreme Court standard, the autopsy
report in Freycinet should be considered testimonial, since it
fulfilled an obvious testimonial purpose and was prepared with
the reasonable expectation of prosecutorial use.
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE
AN EXPERT WHOSE TESTIMONY RELIES ON A NONTESTIFYING
ANALYST’S REPORT: BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO
In Melendez-Diaz, the forensic report held by the Supreme
Court to be testimonial was admitted without accompanying
expert testimony. In Brown, Meekins, and Freycinet, by
contrast, the prosecution offered the reports through the
testimony of experts who examined them and were familiar with
the labs’ procedures, but did not call any analyst who
participated in the testing. Thus, the question becomes whether
this matters. Logically, the answer should be no; the crossexaminer will remain unable to ask questions that test either the
professional background or the techniques and procedures
utilized by the person who performed the analysis. One
commentator has observed that under these circumstances, “[t]he
expert witness is not meaningfully subject to cross-examination,
because the basis of his opinion cannot be tested according to
the constitutionally prescribed procedure for assessing
testimonial hearsay: cross-examination of the hearsay
128
declarant.”
The United States Supreme Court adopted this reasoning,
with reservations expressed in a concurring opinion by Justice
Sotomayor, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.129 In Bullcoming, a
certified lab report of a test performed on the defendant’s blood
128

Seaman, supra note 21, at 880.
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2713–16; id. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
129
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alcohol level by an independent state agency was admitted, as a
business record, through a supervisor from the lab who had not
observed or performed the test. The state court held that
[a]lthough
the
blood
alcohol
report
was
testimonial, . . . its admission did not violate the
Confrontation Clause, because the analyst who prepared
the report was a mere scrivener who simply transcribed
the results generated by a gas chromatograph machine
and, therefore, the live, in-court testimony of another
qualified analyst was sufficient to satisfy Defendant’s
right to confrontation.130
A closely divided Supreme Court reversed. Justice Ginsburg
wrote the opinion, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kagan, and
Sotomayor joined for the most part. Justice Sotomayor also
wrote a concurrence primarily in order to stress the principal
opinion’s “limited reach.”131 The Bullcoming Court held that the
in-court testimony of a supervisor who lacked any connection to
the test was an entirely inadequate substitute for testimony from
the analyst: “surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the
constitutional requirement. The accused’s right is to be
confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless
that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an
opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular
scientist.”132 The supervisor’s testimony “could not convey what
[the analyst] knew or observed about the events his certification
concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he
employed. Nor could such surrogate testimony expose any
lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s part.”133 In short, the
Confrontation Clause “does not tolerate dispensing with
confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning
one witness about another’s testimonial statements provides a
134
fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.”
130

State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 4 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2705 (2011).
131
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
132
Id. at 2710 (majority opinion).
133
Id. at 2715.
134
Id. at 2716.
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In so holding, the Supreme Court upended the only basis upon
which the court of appeals distinguished Brown from Melendez-Diaz:
the presence in Brown of an opportunity to cross-examine a
surrogate expert not involved in the testing. The Supreme Court has
authoritatively discredited the entire analysis of Meekins and Brown.
The Bullcoming Court determined with little difficulty that the
lab report was testimonial under Melendez-Diaz. As in that
decision, the report’s evidentiary purpose rendered it testimonial,
trumping the state’s reliance on its allegedly non-“adversarial”
nature.135 Although, unlike in Melendez-Diaz, the report was not
sworn, it was sufficiently “formalized,” since the analyst signed a
certificate concerning the result of the analysis.136 In addition,
relying on Crawford, the Bullcoming Court ruled that the report’s
“comparative reliability . . . does not overcome the Sixth
Amendment bar.”137
The latter pronouncement was somewhat surprising, coming
as it did just four months after the Court’s decision in Michigan
v. Bryant.138 In a opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court
determined in Bryant that an identification of the defendant by a
shooting victim to police on the street a short time after the
shooting was nontestimonial. The Court based its determination
on its view that the “primary purpose” of the interaction between
the victim and the police officer was “to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency,” rather than “to create a record
for trial.”139 The Bryant Court relied, in part, on its conclusion
that the victim’s statement was reliable, and likely fell within the
“excited utterance” exception to the rule against hearsay.140
Diverging sharply from Crawford, the Court opined that a
statement’s reliability, and whether it qualified under a settled
exception to the rule against hearsay, were significant factors
141
militating against its testimonial quality.
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id. at 2717.
Id.
Id. at 2715.
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
Id. at 1150, 1155.
Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1157.
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The opinion of the Court in Bullcoming seemingly signifies
that the Bryant decision’s focus on reliability was not the
precursor to a full-scale retreat from Crawford as some had
believed, at least regarding the testimonial status of laboratory
reports. Justice Sotomayor, the author of Bryant, stressed in her
Bullcoming concurrence that Bryant “deemed reliability, as
reflected in the hearsay rules, to be ‘relevant,’ not ‘essential.’”142
However, her opinion also pointed out recurring fact patterns in
lab report cases that she viewed as left open by Bullcoming: (1)
cases in which there is an alternate purpose, or alternate primary
purpose, for the report; (2) cases in which the testifying witness
has some connection to the test at issue; (3) cases in which an
expert is asked for her independent opinion about underlying
testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into
evidence; and (4) cases in which the state introduces only
“machine-generated results.”143 The Supreme Court should
shortly address the third of these fact patterns in Williams v.
Illinois.144
The New York court of appeals has not addressed a
Confrontation Clause lab report issue since Bullcoming. Given
the court’s manifest failure to apply controlling Supreme Court
precedent in the post-Melendez-Diaz case of People v. Brown, it
is impossible to predict what it will do in such a case, though an
essential element of Brown, the supposedly critical in-court
presence of a surrogate expert, has now been declared irrelevant
by the Supreme Court. It is noteworthy that in People v.
Morrison,145 decided after Bullcoming, the Fourth Department
held that the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights had been
violated by the introduction of a certified DNA report prepared
142

Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(quoting Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155–56).
143
Id. at 2721–23.
144
Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505 (U.S. argued Dec. 6, 2011); see
People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2011), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct.
3090 (2011). In Williams, an expert testified in court, despite the fact that he
was not involved in conducting the DNA testing. The report itself was not
admitted, but a critical part of its substance was made known to the jury. See
Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 271–72.
145
People v. Morrison, 935 N.Y.S.2d 234 (App. Div. 2011).
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by an analyst who did not testify, where the prosecution did call
another analyst who read the report and determined that the lab
had followed proper procedure. The court cited Bullcoming, but
did not discuss it, instead choosing to factually distinguish
Brown.146
CONCLUSION
Following its important recognition of the testimonialhearsay character of expert “basis” testimony in Goldstein, the
court of appeals has taken an insupportably restrictive view of
Crawford in subsequent decisions involving the admission of
scientific test reports in the absence of an opportunity to crossexamine the lab analyst. Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming have
discredited the court of appeals’ decisions in Meekins and
Freycinet, although those cases were defensible at the time they
were decided. The court’s refusal to reconsider Meekins in
Brown, decided after Melendez-Diaz, is astonishing, and the
court has already missed an opportunity to rectify that mistake
after Bullcoming by denying permission to appeal in People v.
Hall,147 in which the Appellate Division recently reaffirmed the
validity of Freycinet.148 Of course, intervening developments at
the Supreme Court, particularly the forthcoming decision in
Williams v. Illinois, could be dispositive as well. The court of
appeals has shown no signs of considering an independent state
constitutional approach in this area. Unfortunately, its
unanimous rejection of the defendant’s Confrontation Cause
claim in Brown provides no assurance that it will follow binding
Supreme Court Sixth Amendment authority either.
146

Id. The Appellate Division determined that the Confrontation Clause
violation was harmless error. Id. at 237.
147
People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 2011), leave denied,
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 97220(U) (Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012) (Lippman, Ch. J.).
148
Id. at 428. Following Bullcoming, two circuits and one state high
court have recognized that autopsy reports are testimonial in character.
United States v. Ignasiak, Nos. 09-10596, 09-16005, 10-11074, 2012 WL
149314, at *9–12 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012); United States v. Moore, 651
F.3d 30, 69–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011); People v. Lewis, 806 N.W.2d 295 (Mich.
2011).

